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Abstract: Epidemiological analysis suggests the ongoing Zika epidemic in Latin America 
may have already peaked, limiting the scope for interventions to have a major impact, but 
that herd-immunity will likely supress transmission for a decade or more once the current 
epidemic concludes, giving a valuable time window for development of vaccines and novel 
vector controls. 
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The last three years have seen Latin America invaded by two arboviruses of significant public 
health concern. Chikungunya swept through the Caribbean in late 2013, causing substantial 
autochthonous outbreaks in the region from 2014 onwards (1). Thought to cause milder 
disease, Zika initially caused less concern than Chikungunya, but by May 2015, it was clear 
that the Northeast region of Brazil was experiencing a major epidemic (Fig. 1). The 
perception of the public health threat posed by Zika changed dramatically in late 2015 when a 
surge in microcephaly cases in new-borns was seen in areas of Brazil (see Supplementary 
Material [SM]) following widespread Zika transmission earlier that year (2).   Evidence for a 
causal link between Zika infection and microcephaly and other serious congenital anomalies 
is compelling (3), prompting the World Health Organization to declare Zika a public health 
emergency of international concern in February 2016 (4). However, it is far from clear how 
policymakers should best respond.  
The first challenge in formulating an effective public health response has been the sheer 
speed of the epidemic spread; indeed, surveillance data suggest that the epidemic has peaked 
in many places as of May 2016, with incidence now declining in the many of the countries 
for which data are available (Fig. 1). Immediate policy responses to the crisis have included 
enhanced vector control (5) and advice to delay pregnancy in a few countries (6), followed by 
an extended recommendation to all affected countries by WHO in June 2016. Both have 
merits, but are likely to have limited effectiveness (7) and may indeed interact 
antagonistically. To gain insight into why – and to assess the longer-term risks posed by Zika 
and prioritise interventions – it is necessary to understand the dynamics and drivers of disease 
invasion.  
Three key factors determine the scale and speed of spread of an emerging infection in a naïve 
population and the risk of longer-term endemicity. The first is the transmissibility of the 
infection, characterised by the reproduction number, R – the average number of secondary 
infections caused by a typical index case. R is typically at its maximum at the start of an 
epidemic – then termed R0 (the basic reproduction number) – before population immunity has 
accumulated. We provide time-varying estimates of R for affected Latin American countries 
where surveillance data are available (Fig. 1 and see SM). Despite the limitations of current 
surveillance systems (i.e. generally low levels of laboratory confirmation and major changes 
in surveillance sensitivity over time), a relatively consistent picture is seen: R0 estimates vary 
between approximately 1.5 and 6, similar to published values for Zika in French Polynesia 
and dengue (8) (see SM). Trends at the country level hide substantial subnational 
heterogeneity (see SM), however. Geographic variation in vector habitat quality and 
spatiotemporal variation in temperature and rainfall affect both vector density and 
competence, leading us to expect that Zika will show high levels of spatial and seasonal 
variation in transmissibility, comparable to those seen for dengue (9, 10).  
The generation time (Tg, the time between cycles of infection in an epidemic, see SM) is the 
second key factor affecting the timescale of disease invasions. Taking our estimates of R0 
(Fig. 1) and our best estimate of the generation time distribution for Zika (mean 20.0 days, 
standard deviation 7.4 days, see SM), we use a simple stochastic spatial model of Zika 
transmission (see SM) to illustrate the dynamics of the initial epidemic and possible future 
waves of transmission (Fig. 2a). We expect the initial wave of transmission to be largely over 
in 3 years, with seasonal oscillations in incidence caused by seasonal variation in mosquito 
populations and transmissibility. Herd immunity will likely then cause a delay of over a 
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decade until further large epidemics are possible; an epidemic of an immunizing infection 
peaks when depletion of susceptibles (and consequent growth of herd immunity) drives R 
down to 1, but transmission then continues as incidence declines – leading to R decreasing to 
substantially below 1 by the end of the epidemic. Following the epidemic, herd immunity 
begins to decline (and R to increase) as new births replenish the susceptible population, but 
sustained transmission is only likely when R exceeds 1 once again. The time required for this 
to occur depends non-monotonically on R0, with intermediate values of R0 (1.5-3.5) giving 
the maximum delay (see SM). 
The large-scale connectivity of human populations is the third key factor affecting the 
dynamics of disease invasions. Human mobility patterns determine the chance an infection 
present in one location will be introduced elsewhere, thus fundamentally affecting the early 
dynamics when numbers of infections are low and spread is highly stochastic. As numbers of 
infections grow in one area, so does the risk of export to another. Thus, while the seeding of 
infection in Brazil was a chance event (11), once a full-blown epidemic was underway, 
export of substantial numbers of infections across the Americas was inevitable and rapid, 
leading to the widespread epidemics which unfolded from May 2015. This is reflected in our 
modelled dynamics, where we find that the duration of the initial wave of transmission is 
relatively insensitive to the degree of population connectivity (see SM). 
Modelling also gives insight into how the age distribution of infection will evolve over time – 
of particular relevance to Zika, given the risk of congenital Zika syndrome and microcephaly 
in infants faced by pregnant women. During the initial epidemic, we would expect all ages to 
be equally affected unless exposure and/or susceptibility vary substantially with age. The 
mean age of infection would then fall substantially in future epidemics, given the immunity 
acquired by older people through past exposure. If R0 were sufficiently high, then in the long 
term most infections would be expected to occur in childhood, before the typical age women 
first give birth (see SM). Unfortunately, our estimates of R0 (Fig. 1) suggest such a large 
reduction in the mean age of infection is unlikely to occur for Zika. If Zika becomes endemic, 
we predict that while the mean age of cases will fall compared with what has been seen thus 
far, it will still be sufficiently high to pose an ongoing and substantial risk to pregnant women 
(Fig. 2 and SM). This conclusion is supported by analysis of historical Zika seroprevalence 
data presented in the companion review article published in this issue (12). 
How does this analysis inform what policymakers should do now? Advising against 
pregnancy has been criticised for being infeasible for many women – especially long term 
(6). Our analysis suggests (see SM) that at the provincial scale, the duration of the first wave 
of transmission is typically under 6 months, though in some locations the timing of virus 
introduction can interact with seasonality of transmissibility to extend a local epidemic over 
two transmission seasons. Thus if recommendations to delay pregnancy were tuned to the 
local (subnational) context and adapted in light of local surveillance data, in many areas they 
could be kept in place for a shorter time – making adherence more feasible while retaining 
the potential risk-reduction benefits. This could be even more relevant as microcephaly cases 
have been reported born to asymptomatic pregnant women (13). However, local optimization 
of this and other control or risk-reduction measures requires timely availability of high-
quality geographically stratified surveillance data. 
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Enhanced vector control is also potentially beneficial, but it is critical for policymakers to set 
realistic expectations about the likely impact. Evidence (12, 14) suggests traditional 
insecticide-based control is rarely sufficiently effective to stop dengue epidemics (i.e. achieve 
R<1). Effectiveness would need to be considerably higher to stop the first epidemic of a new 
virus in a naive population. But vector control with limited effectiveness could – if sustained 
– reduce the attack rates seen in the initial epidemic (see SM). Modelling suggests there are 
downsides, however. First, the epidemic may last longer, which might make it even harder 
for women to adhere to recommendations delaying pregnancy. Second, the epidemic will 
overshoot the herd-immunity threshold by less than if interventions had not been introduced – 
leaving a smaller proportion of the population immune and thus reducing the delay until 
population susceptibility once again reaches levels which allow sustained endemic 
transmission to occur (Fig. 2).  
Assessing the long-term risks posed by Zika is critical to prioritising the development of 
novel interventions. What is the likelihood that the virus will become endemic or that 
sporadic epidemics will occur with sufficient regularity to pose an equivalent risk? Modelling 
gives some insight, but cannot be truly predictive given current knowledge gaps. Our analysis 
suggests that once the current epidemic is over, herd immunity will lead to a delay of at least 
a decade before large epidemics may recur (Fig. 2). However, this prediction has caveats: the 
delay to resumption of transmission might be substantially reduced by high levels of 
spatiotemporal heterogeneity in exposure risk (not accounted for in our model) or transient 
reductions in transmission caused by interventions or population behaviour change. In 
addition, our model makes the conservative assumption that flavivirus transmissibility in 
Latin America has not been anomalously high in the last 2-3 years and therefore predicts the 
virus will eventually become endemic. Endemicity in this case does not imply predictable 
annual epidemics in all regions, but rather that sustained transmission would be expected 
somewhere in the continent every year – akin to what is seen for individual dengue serotypes 
today. However, if Zika transmissibility is strongly modulated by longer term climatic 
variation (such as El Niño), the virus may not be able to sustain endemic transmission, 
resulting in much more sporadic but larger scale epidemics when reseeding of infection 
coincides with favourable conditions for transmission. Last, we have assumed a constant risk 
of reseeding of the infection into the human population; if a sylvatic reservoir for Zika is 
established in the Americas (12, 15), the background level of human exposure may increase. 
A more precise assessment of the long-term risks requires several key data gaps to be filled. 
We need to measure the extent of (and geographic variation in) herd immunity in populations 
which have experienced recent Zika epidemics. Studies should not be restricted to Latin 
America – it is equally important to understand apparent differences in Zika epidemiology 
between continents. Currently, we cannot assess whether Asia is also at risk of a major Zika 
epidemic – or indeed, why the scale of transmission in Latin America has been so much 
greater than anything previously seen. Multiple hypotheses have been proposed (12) but 
cannot yet be tested: immunological enhancement from prior exposure to dengue, El Niño-
driven climate effects, viral evolution and regional genetic differences in the Aedes aegypti 
populations may all play a role. While data is currently limited (16), cross-reactivity with 
dengue is a particular concern, as our analysis indicates both cross-protection and 
enhancement could shorten the time until epidemics can reoccur and increase the chances of 
long-term endemic transmission (Fig. 2). Age-structured seroprevalence surveys are a 
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priority, using assays which can distinguish exposure to Zika from exposure to other 
flaviviruses. Such surveys allow estimation of variation in exposure with time and age, of 
interactions with other flaviviruses, and of overall transmissibility (e.g. to be compared with 
those in Fig. 1) (12). Long-term cohort studies can provide even richer longitudinal data to 
examine individual variation in exposure and clinical and immunological outcomes.   
Finally, innovation and a global perspective are required when developing and evaluating 
vaccines and novel vector control measures (17) for both Zika and Chikungunya. The 
traditional model for efficacy trials used for endemic diseases poses major challenges for 
emerging infections with sporadic and unpredictable epidemics. While phase I safety studies 
for antivirals and vaccines do not require active transmission, efficacy studies do. Our 
analysis suggests there is limited time to initiate such studies in the current epidemic before 
incidence may be insufficient to measure impacts. Given the unpredictable timing and 
intensity of Zika (and chikungunya) outbreaks, future efficacy trials may need to be pre-
approved in a large number of potential trial sites, then rapidly initiated in particular sites 
only once local transmission has been detected. Efficacy studies for vaccines may need to 
recruit and vaccinate participants now and follow-up for a longer period than is typical. 
Active case detection in multiple sites over a long time period would be prohibitively 
expensive, so study protocols need to be adaptive – such as planning to start active 
surveillance in a trial site only when Zika transmission is detected, even if the outbreak 
occurs several years after vaccination took place. Evaluating rare endpoints such as 
microcephaly poses particular difficulties, requiring very large-scale trials if undertaken in 
advance of an epidemic, or accepting the risks associated with using a novel vaccine in 
pregnant women if undertaken in the face of an epidemic. 
Zika follows Ebola as a public health crisis where policymakers have had to make decisions 
in the presence of enormous uncertainty. In such contexts, it is natural to reach for policies 
which mirror those used previously. We argue that real-time epidemiological analysis based 
on high quality and publically available surveillance data can critically inform such decision-
making. Zika and Ebola epidemiology and policy options differ fundamentally. The current 
Zika epidemic is not containable; at best interventions can mitigate its health impacts. More 
optimistically, the natural dynamics of the epidemic are now likely to give a multi-year 
window to develop new interventions before further large-scale outbreaks occur.  
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Fig. 1. Publically available surveillance data on weekly suspected (light grey) and laboratory 
confirmed (dark grey) Zika cases (left axis and bars) overlaid with estimates of the reproduction 
number, R, over time (running 5-week average shown, centred on the middle week). Yellow shading 
shows the time window over which R was estimated, since surveillance in some countries took some 
weeks to establish.  The vertical dashed line marks the first week of 2016 and the horizontal dashed 
line marks the R =1 threshold. Countries with the largest numbers of reported cases are shown; see 
SM for other countries, sources and estimation methods. 
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Fig. 2. Typical simulated time series of Zika weekly infection incidence per 1000 people in a 
population of 600 million for three scenarios: no interventions (blue curve), interventions which 
decrease mosquito lifespan by 20% for one year during the initial epidemic (red curve), and assuming 
a degree of cross-immunity in the population from prior dengue exposure (green curve). Incidence is 
plotted on a non-linear scale (increments of 2 up to 10, then increments of 20) to allow later epidemics 
to be resolved clearly. Shaded insets show incidence dynamics (coloured curves) in the 20 spatial 
regions being modelled together with the age distributions (10 year age bands) of infections (dark 
grey bars) and mean age of infection for the first two epidemic periods in the no intervention scenario. 
Full details provided in SM. 
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